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Abstract  
The scale of international migration flows depends on moving costs that are, in turn, 
influenced by host-country policies and by the size of migrant networks at destination. This 
paper estimates the influence of visa policies and networks upon bilateral migration flows to 
multiple destinations. We rely on a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator to derive 
estimates that are consistent under more general distributional assumptions on the 
underlying RUM model than the ones commonly adopted in the literature. We derive 
bounds for the estimated direct and indirect effects of visa policies and networks that reflect 
the uncertainty connected to the use of aggregate data, and we show that bilateral 
migration flows can be highly sensitive to the immigration policies set by other destination 
countries, an externality that we are able to quantify.  
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“Not only is the world not flat, it is not a curb nor a barrier. Rather, the world has a massive cliff at the
U.S. border (and, one suspects, most other rich industrial countries have similarly sized cliffs).”
(Pritchett, 2009, p. 274)
1 Introduction
The share of the world population currently residing outside its country of birth is estimated
at around 3 percent (UN Population Division, 2008). It is generally argued that the legal
restrictions on cross-border human mobility play a key role in keeping this figure low, as
“policy barriers in the destination countries surely play a major role in constraining emigra-
tion” (Clemens, 2011, p. 83), and “labor mobility is likely lower than it could be by a factor
of between two and five, because it is constrained by host-country policies” (Pritchett, 2006,
p. 69).
The policies that exert an influence on the size of migration flows are not only the regula-
tions that shape the legal framework for immigrant admission, such as quotas or point-based
systems, but they encompass any policy intervention that influences the costs and expected
benefits from migration. Policy-induced migration costs create a “cliff at the border” (Pritch-
ett, 2009) that hinders the flow of people across countries. Mayda (2010) and Ortega and
Peri (2013) provide empirical evidence that an aggregate measure of the restrictiveness of
immigration policies reduces incoming flows from all origin countries. Still, some relevant
host-country policies are bilateral in nature, so that potential migrants from different origins
can face differently sized cliffs along the same border.
Visa policies are one part of the legal framework regulating non-immigrant temporary
admission at destination and represent a factor that can shape the height of the cliff at
the border. The requirement of a visa to enter a country can impose substantial costs on
travelers, as it forces them to submit an application to the consular offices of their intended
destination, which can ask for processing fees, impose long waiting times, and possibly deny
the visa (Neumayer, 2006). A visa waiver allows individuals to move across borders at a
substantially lower cost, and with greatly reduced uncertainty with respect to their admission
at destination.1 This, in turn, suggests that the bilateral visa regime can also influence the
scale of migration flows, as it determines the cost of entering legally into the country of
1Neumayer (2010) provides evidence on the negative impact of visa requirements on the number of
travelers between countries.
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destination, and then overstaying there beyond the period for which admission was granted.
The US General Accounting Office (2004) reports that overstayers amounted to 2.3 million
in 2000, accounting for at least 27 percent of illegal immigrants in the US. Six EU member
states addressed in 2012 a complaint to the European Commissioner for Home Affairs about
the alleged increase in migration inflows from the five Eastern European countries whose
citizens had been granted a visa-free access to the Schengen area between 2009 and 2010.2
Still, the evidence on the influence of the visa regime, and of bilateral immigration policies
more in general, upon the scale of international migration flows is limited. Bertoli et al.
(2011) present descriptive evidence on the role of the visa waivers that Spain used to grant
to some of its former colonies in Latin America in determining the size of immigration
flows from Ecuador, and Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013) provide econometric
evidence of the influence of changes in visa policies in shaping the size of bilateral flows
during the surge of Spanish immigration that began in the late 1990s. Visa waivers exert
a positive but only marginally significant effect on migration rates in Grogger and Hanson
(2011).
How can we reconcile the perception that destination country policies represent a binding
constraint on international migration with the limited empirical evidence on the effects of
bilateral policies? Two closely related factors, namely the endogeneity of immigration policies
and the dependence of bilateral flows on the attractiveness of other destinations, can explain
this puzzle. With respect to visas, Chiswick (1988) observes that “the careful scrutiny given
visa applicants, which offends many foreign students and visitors to the United States, is
intended to ferret out those most likely to violate their visas” (p. 104), and the European
legislation explicitly refers to the potential for illegal immigration from an origin country as
one of the key criteria that is used to determine the visa policy toward its citizens.3 Hence,
2“L’aﬄux de migrants des Balkans pre`occupe l’Union europe´enne”, Le Monde, October 24, 2012. The
complaint was related to the increase in the number of asylum seekers from these countries, the same
reason that also induced Canada to reintroduce in July 2009 the visa requirement on Czech citizens
that had been lifted in October 2007, as described by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (source:
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/backgrounders/2009/2009-07-13a.asp, accessed on Decem-
ber 16, 2012).
3“The determination of those third countries whose nationals are subject to the visa requirement, and
those exempt from it, is governed by a considered, case-by-case assessment of a variety of criteria relating
inter alia to illegal immigration, public policy and security” (Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, March
15, 2001).
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the bilateral visa regime can be correlated with unobservable factors that also shape the
scale of migration flows.
Bilateral visa policies toward a given country are closely correlated across different des-
tinations. The visa regimes that citizens from different origin countries face are highly
polarized: holding a passport of a developed country grants visa-free admission (almost)
everywhere, while citizens from developing countries need to apply for a visa to be admitted
in most destinations around the world.4 Such a similarity in the bilateral visa policies toward
the citizens of any given country can come from a policy coordination at the supranational
level, as it occurs within the Schengen area, from a shared perception of the potential for
illegal immigration or from the anticipation of an externality due to the policies adopted by
other countries (Boeri and Bru¨cker, 2005; Giordani and Ruta, 2013).
This can, in turn, create a further key analytical challenge to the identification of the
effects of bilateral migration policies due to the complex dependence of bilateral migration
flows upon the opportunities to migrate to other countries. The influence exerted by the
attractiveness of alternative destinations upon the bilateral migration rate was labeled mul-
tilateral resistance to migration by Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013), as the
concept bears a close resemblance with the multilateral resistance that arises in gravity
models of international trade (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). However, as it is the case
in the international finance literature (Okawa and van Wincoop, 2012), the type of gravity
equation5 implied by a general specification of the behavior of migration flows goes beyond
the simple extension proposed by Anderson (2011) and requires a different methodology.
Even in the absence of general equilibrium effects or market clearing conditions, multilat-
eral resistance to migration arises when unobservables prevent the econometrician from fully
modeling the attractiveness of each destination. In such a case, the identification of the effect
of the visa regime can be confounded by the visa policies adopted by other countries: poten-
tial migrants’ destination choices depend on the relative size of the cliffs that characterize
different borders rather than on their absolute size.
These arguments entail that the limited evidence on the effectiveness of bilateral im-
migration policies could be related to the confounding influence of the policies adopted in
other countries of destination. The contribution of this paper is to propose an econometric
approach that is able to identify the effect of dyadic variables on bilateral migration flows
4“No visa required: Who has more freedom to travel?”, The Economist, August 25, 2010.
5See Beine et al. (2014) on this.
Etudes et Documents n° 27, CERDI, 2014
6
while controlling for such a confounding effect in a cross-sectional setting,6 while at the same
time greatly reducing the concerns related to differences in unobservables across countries
that are subject to different visa regimes. In addition, we use our estimates to measure
the diversion of the flows to other countries that is produced by the introduction of a visa
requirement by one destination. This represents a migration policy externality that we are
able to quantify. To our knowledge, this paper presents the first empirical estimate of an
explicit migration policy externality.
We employ a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood, PPML, estimator that allows us (i)
to be consistent with underlying random utility maximization, RUM, models with differ-
ent patterns of dependency of the bilateral flows on the attractiveness of other destinations
(Guimaraes et al., 2004; Schmidheiny and Bru¨lhart, 2011), and (ii) to deal with heteroscedas-
tic disturbances (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) and with the presence of zeros (Santos
Silva and Tenreyro, 2011).
The consistency of the PPML estimator with an underlying RUM model was first es-
tablished by Guimaraes et al. (2003), and then extended by Guimaraes et al. (2004) and
Schmidheiny and Bru¨lhart (2011) under more general specifications of the stochastic compo-
nent of location-specific utility. The RUM-consistency of PPML under different specifications
of the error term creates, as discussed in Schmidheiny and Bru¨lhart (2011), an uncertainty
about the size of the estimated elasticities of bilateral flows with respect to the regressors
that had not been considered yet by the international migration literature. Our paper ex-
tends Schmidheiny and Bru¨lhart (2011), proposing bounds for the estimated elasticity under
a more general specification of the stochastic properties of the underlying theoretical model
describing the location-decision problem that potential migrants face.
This paper is related to three different strands of literature. First, the literature on
the determinants of international migration flows that we reviewed above.7 Second, the
literature on discrete choice models (McFadden, 1974, 1978; Cardell, 1997; Train, 2003);
third, the papers establishing the consistency of aggregate count data models with individual-
level utility maximizing behavior (Guimaraes et al., 2003, 2004; Schmidheiny and Bru¨lhart,
6Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013) propose a more general econometric approach that re-
quires a longitudinal dimension that is often unavailable with international migration data.
7Other relevant empirical papers include Clark et al. (2007), Lewer and den Berg (2008), Belot and
Hatton (2012), McKenzie et al. (2013), Bratsberg et al. (2012), Beine and Parsons (2014) and Bertoli et al.
(2013a).
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2011).
Our econometric analysis draws on the international migration data assembled by Doc-
quier et al. (2009), which we combine with the dataset by Ozden et al. (2011) to obtain
information on the size of the migration networks back in 1960, and with the dataset on
bilateral visa policies by Neumayer (2006).
The choice of the various specifications of the model to be estimated with PPML are
derived from a simple RUM model. The estimates confirm the significant influence of migra-
tion networks evidenced by Beine et al. (2011), and they also reveal that visa policies play
a significant role in shaping the height of the cliffs at the border: when the attractiveness of
other destinations is properly controlled for, a visa requirement is estimated to reduce the
scale of bilateral migration flows between 40 and 47 percent on average. Such an effect is
not significant in specifications that are only consistent with more restrictive assumptions on
the underlying RUM model, and whose validity is questioned by the tests that we conduct
on the residuals. Our results confirm the pressing need to properly control for the confound-
ing influence exerted by the attractiveness of alternative destinations, that is, multilateral
resistance to migration.
As far as migration policy externalities are concerned, we estimate that a visa requirement
imposed by one destination can increase bilateral migration flows to other destinations from
the origin country subject to the visa by between 3 and 17 percent on average. In some
particular cases, this externality effect might even be larger than the own-country effect.
These results are robust when we estimate our model for each skill group, and we find that
low-skill migration flows respond slightly more to changes in visa requirements than high-skill
flows.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops a simple RUM model
that describes the location decision problem that potential migrants face. Section 3 presents
our estimation approach. The data sources and the basic descriptive statistics are presented
in Section 4. Section 5 contains the results from the econometric analysis, while Section 6
presents a number of robustness checks. Section 6 draws the main conclusions.
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2 A RUM model of international migration
Consider a population of sj individuals originating from a country j ∈ H, who have to choose
their preferred location among the n countries belonging to the set D, including j itself.8
Let mjk represent the scale of the bilateral gross migration flow from country j to country
k, and mj be the n× 1 vector that collects all the bilateral migration flows originating from
country j. We can express its k-th element, mjk, as:
mjk = sjpjkηjk (1)
where pjk is the expected probability that an individual from country j will move to
country k ∈ D and ηj is a vector of spatially uncorrelated errors, with E(ηjk) = 1 for all
dyads (j, k).
2.1 Choice probabilities
The n elements of the vector pj are the outcome of a location decision problem that individ-
uals face and that we describe through a RUM model. Specifically, the utility Uijk that the
individual i from country j obtains from opting for destination k is given by the sum of a
dyad-specific deterministic component Vjk and of an individual-specific stochastic term ijk:
Uijk = Vjk + ijk (2)
The vector pij = (pij1, ..., pijn) that collects the choice probabilities for individual i over
the n locations depends on the assumptions about the distribution of the stochastic term.
These are, in turn, closely related with the specification of the deterministic component of
utility in (2), which is usually assumed to be a linear function of a vector xjk:
Vjk = xjk
′β (3)
Since the seminal contributions by McFadden (1974, 1978), the literature on discrete
choice models has typically assumed that ijk follows an Extreme Value Type-1 marginal
distribution, with this assumption allowing to write down the choice probability pjk as a
8We present the RUM model omitting the time dimension of the location decision problem that potential
migrants face, but the analysis can be extended to allow for such a dimension.
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destination-specific analytic function of the vector Vj of the deterministic components of
utility, i.e., pjk = fk(Vj). If and only if the stochastic component of utility is i.i.d. EVT-1,
then the choice probabilities can be represented through a conditional logit model and they
satisfy the property of the independence from irrelevant alternatives, which implies that the
ratio pjk/pjh is not a function of the full n× 1 vector Vj, but only of the difference between
Vjk and Vjh.
As Train (2003) observes, the independence from irrelevant alternatives can be seen “as
the natural outcome of a well-specified model that captures all sources of correlation over
alternatives into representative utility, so that only white noise remains.” (p. 76). Thus,
this analytically convenient property fails if data constraints prevent a full specification of
the deterministic component of utility. Then, the realization of ijk contains information on
the realizations of the stochastic components of utility for other alternatives. This entails, in
turn, that the choice probability pjk becomes more sensitive to variations in the deterministic
component of utility of alternative locations with which location k shares some unobserved
determinants of utility than the conditional logit model would predict.
The literature on discrete choice models has introduced a variety of distributional assump-
tions that allow for a non-zero correlation across alternatives in the stochastic component of
utility. These models give rise to a more flexible pattern of responses of the elements of the
vector pj when the elements of Vj vary. The richer structure of the stochastic component of
utility in (2) is precisely meant to correct for the bias in the estimation of the coefficients of
the determinants of Vjk that would otherwise be produced by its incorrect specification.
While modeling migration decisions, the need to introduce more general distributional
assumptions naturally arises from the presence of unobserved determinants of the attractive-
ness of a country, and from the estimation of the determinants of bilateral migration flows
on aggregate data. Imagine, for instance, that cultural proximity with the origin country
j, which is unobservable for the econometrician, influences the attractiveness of the various
destinations; then, a potential migrant from the origin j receives a utility, conditional upon
observables, from locating in culturally close destinations that systematically differs from
the utility associated to culturally distant destinations.
The assumption, which we retain from the literature, that the vector of parameters β in
(3) does not vary across individuals implies that any heterogeneity in the relationship between
the elements of xjk and Uijk ends up in ijk, introducing a correlation in the stochastic
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component of utility across destinations.9 Suppose, for instance, that one of the elements
of xjk is represented by a dummy variable that signals whether country j and country k
share an official language, as in Grogger and Hanson (2011) or Beine et al. (2011). The
specification of Vjk in (3) implies that the deterministic component of utility that a Belgian
would-be migrant obtains from locating in any destination does not depend on whether she
is Walloon (French-speaking) or Flemish (Dutch-speaking). This, in turn, implies that the
higher (lower) utility that a Walloon (Flemish) receives from locating in any country that
has French among its official languages introduces a positive correlation in the stochastic
component of utility across French-speaking destinations. Along the same lines, destination
countries differ with respect to the average level and the dispersion of wages. Location-
specific utility Uijk is increasing with the average level of wages in k for all potential migrants
from j, while the dispersion of wages can produce an opposite influence on the attractiveness
of this destination for individuals characterized by different levels of ability (Borjas, 1987).
This is why the presence of unobservables and the specification of utility in (2) that is
adopted in the literature calls for relaxing the assumption that the stochastic component of
utility is independently distributed across countries when deriving equations to be estimated
on aggregate bilateral migration data.
2.1.1 Distributional assumptions
Let the set of possible locations D be partitioned into m ≥ 1 subsets b, also called nests,
and let b(k) ⊆ D denote the unique subset to which location k belongs to. Nests are groups
of countries that share some observed or unobserved characteristics that influence their
attractiveness, and whose impact can be heterogeneous across individuals. The individual
stochastic component ijk of utility is assumed to be a mixture of a nest-specific and of a
location-specific term:
ijk = (1− τ)νijb(k) + τυijk (4)
where τ ∈ (0, 1] is the weight associated to the location-specific term, υijk iid∼ EVT-1 and
νijb(k) is the unique random variable, whose distribution depends on τ , that ensures that
also ijk follows an EVT-1 marginal distribution (Cardell, 1997). The presence of the nest-
9“That heterogeneity is a special type of correlation amongst choice situations is not well understood.”
(Hensher and Greene, 2003, p. 160).
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specific stochastic component νijb(k) introduces a positive correlation in the realizations of
the stochastic component of utility for the locations belonging to the same nest; specifically,
we have that corr(ijk, ijh) =
√
1− τ 2 if b(k) = b(h), and zero otherwise. The higher the
weight τ associated to the location-specific term, the lower the within-nest correlation of the
stochastic component of utility in (2).
2.1.2 The vector of choice probabilities
The element k in the vector of choice probabilities pij is equal to:
10
pijk =
exjk
′β/τ
(∑
l∈b(k) e
xjl
′β/τ
)τ−1
∑
q
(∑
l∈bq e
xjl′β/τ
)τ (5)
Averaging over individual decisions, we have that pij = pj, which in turn allows us to
rewrite the element k of the vector mj of bilateral migration flows as follows:
mjk = sj
exjk
′β/τ
(∑
l∈b(k) e
xjl
′β/τ
)τ−1
∑
q
(∑
l∈bq e
xjl′β/τ
)τ ηjk (6)
The assumptions on the stochastic component of location-specific utility in (4) are more
general than those adopted by other papers in the literature; specifically, our distributional
assumptions reduce to those adopted by Grogger and Hanson (2011) if we further assume
that all locations belong to a unique nest, i.e., b(k) = D, ∀k ∈ D. Similarly, we can obtain the
distributional assumptions in Ortega and Peri (2013), Beine et al. (2011) and McKenzie et al.
(2013) by imposing the restriction that all locations but the origin belong to a unique nest,
i.e. b(j) = {j} and b(k) = D/{j} for any k ∈ D. This assumption implies that, conditional
upon the deterministic component of location-specific utility, potential migrants regard all
possible countries except the origin as being close substitutes, and it can accommodate for
differences in unobservables between migrants and stayers.
The assumptions on the stochastic component ijk that we introduced in (4) allow for a
richer pattern of cross-elasticities, as potential migrants can perceive a destination h to be
a close substitute only for a subset of all the potential destinations, represented by the nest
b(h) ⊂ D. Specifically, we can use (6) to derive the elasticity of the bilateral migration flow
10See, for instance, Train (2003) for the derivation of the choice probability.
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from j to k with respect to the attractiveness of a destination l 6= k for potential migrants
from j:
∂ ln(mjk)
∂ ln(Vjl)
= −
[
τpjk + (1− τ)pjkpjb(k)pjl|b(k)
pjl
]
Vjl/τ (7)
where pjb(k) is the probability that a potential migrant from j opts for a destination in
the nest b(k), and pjl|b(k) is the probability of choosing destination l conditional upon opting
for the nest b(k).11
If destination l ∈ b(k), then (7) simplifies to −pjkVjl/τ , while if the destination l does not
belong to the nest b(k), and hence pjl|b(k) = 0, then the indirect elasticity stands at −pjkVjl.
As the weight τ associated to the location-specific stochastic term in (4) lies between 0 and
1, then the indirect elasticity is larger in magnitude when l ∈ b(k), and it is monotonically
decreasing in τ . Intuitively, the higher the weight (1 − τ) associated to the nest-specific
stochastic component in (4), the greater the sensitivity of bilateral migration flows to a
variation in the attractiveness of another destination within the same nest.
2.1.3 The equation to be estimated
We can rewrite (6) more compactly as follows:
mjk = exp
(
αj + xjk
′β/τ + γjb(k) + ln(ηjk)
)
(8)
where the origin specific term αj is equal to:
αj = ln(sj)− ln
[ m∑
q=1
(∑
l∈bq
exjl
′β/τ
)τ]
and the origin-nest specific term γjb(k) is given by:
γjb(k) = (τ − 1) ln
( ∑
l∈b(k)
exjl
′β/τ
)
Notice that the vector of parameters β of the determinants of location-specific utility in
(3) always appears in (8) scaled by the dissimilarity parameter τ . The estimation of (8) does
not separately identify β and τ , but only the ratio β/τ . As the direct and indirect elasticities
11The corresponding expression for the direct elasticity of migration flows from j to k with respect to Vjk
is ∂ ln(mjk)/∂ ln(Vjk) = [τ(1− pjk) + (1− τ)(1− pjk|b(k))]Vjk/τ .
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presented above depend on τ , this introduces a fundamental uncertainty on their true size
that is independent from the precision with which β/τ is estimated. Section 5.2 below
introduces bounds for the values of the two elasticities, extending the proposed approach by
Schmidheiny and Bru¨lhart (2011).
A further key analytical challenge in the estimation of (8) is represented by the correlation
between the elements of the vector xjk and the term γjb(k) that reflects the expected utility
for potential migrants from j from choosing a location in the nest b(k) (Train, 2003). Such
a correlation arises, for instance, if the destinations belonging to the nest b(k) adopt similar
bilateral immigration policies vis-a´-vis the citizens of the origin country j (Giordani and
Ruta, 2013); in such a case, the attractiveness of destination k would be positively correlated
with the expected utility of opting for other destinations that are close substitutes to country
k via the similarity of their bilateral immigration policies towards j. If γjb(k) is not adequately
controlled for, then the estimation of the vector β/τ would be exposed to an omitted variable
bias.
3 PPML estimation of bilateral migration flows
The estimation approach that represents the industry-standard in the international migration
literature involves a logarithmic transformation of the bilateral migration rates that can be
derived from (8).12 As discussed in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), the assumption that
E(ηjk) = 1 for any j, k does not suffice to conclude that E[ln(ηjk/ηjj)] = 0, as the latter
will be, in general, a function of higher-order moments of the distribution of the error term
in (8); this, in turn, implies that, if ηjk is heteroskedastic with a variance that depends on
the regressors in (6), then the transformed error term ln(ηjk/ηjj) will be correlated with the
regressors, creating a serious threat to identification.
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) proposed to resort to the estimation of (8) through
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation; this approach allows to deal with the pres-
ence of zeros in the dependent variable, and it is gaining momentum in the international
migration literature. PPML estimation performs well even when the data are not Poisson-
12This approach has been adopted, inter alia, by Clark et al. (2007), Lewer and den Berg (2008), Ortega
and Peri (2013), Mayda (2010), McKenzie et al. (2013), Simpson and Sparber (2013), Beine et al. (2011),
Grogger and Hanson (2011) and Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013).
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distributed,13 and when the data present a mass point at zero (Santos Silva and Tenreyro,
2011).14
We discuss here on the consistency of the Poisson estimation with the RUM model that
gives us the expected scale of the observed bilateral migration flows. This requires going
back to the expression for mjk in (8): if one assumes, as before, that b(k) = D, ∀k ∈ D,
i.e., the IIA assumption holds, then we can simplify the expressions for αj and γjb(k), as we
have that αj = ln(sj)− ln
(∑
l∈D e
xjl
′β
)
and γjb(k) = 0. Hence, when IIA characterizes the
underlying RUM model, we can rewrite mjk as follows:
mjk = exp
(
xjk
′β + ln(sj)− ln
(∑
l∈D
exjl
′β
)
+ ln(ηjk)
)
(9)
Some key observations emerge from the inspection of (9). First, the scale of the bi-
lateral migration flow from j to k always depends on the utility associated to all possible
destinations, and not only to the utility associated to the origin j and the destination k.
Second, the adoption of the PPML estimator prevents the identification of the effect
of the so-called push factors of international migration, as the deterministic component of
utility at origin enters into the exponential term in (9) in a non-linear way.15
Third, a RUM-consistent estimation of (9) requires the inclusion of origin dummies to
absorb the effect of population at origin sj and of the attractiveness of all possible locations
upon mjk. The inclusion of origin dummies implies that the expected value of mjk conditional
upon xjk and the set of dummies is independent across all observations in the dataset, which
represents a necessary condition for the estimation of the Poisson model.
Guimaraes et al. (2003) demonstrate that the estimation of (9) through PPML delivers
the same estimate for β as a conditional logit model estimated on individual-level data on
13This estimation technique produces consistent estimates as long as the conditional mean is correctly
specified (Gourieroux et al., 1984).
14The two-part model proposed by Egger et al. (2011) is an alternative way to handle the presence of
a mass point at zero in the data; our estimates are robust to the adoption of this technique. Results are
available from the authors upon request.
15Observe that Vjj enters linearly into the exponential of the ratio of the conditional means for mjk and
mjj ; still, the conditional mean of the ratio mjk/mjj never coincides with the ratio of the two conditional
means (specifically, the conditional mean of mjk/mjj is higher than the ratio of the conditional means of mjk
and mjj by Jensen’s inequality, independently on the distributional assumptions on the underlying data-
generating process), and this, in turn, violates the condition that is required to obtain consistent estimates
with PPML (Gourieroux et al., 1984).
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the same determinants of location-specific utility, as the log-likelihood functions of the two
models are identical up to a constant.16 Hence, this estimation technique is fully consistent
with the underlying RUM model that describes the choice of the utility-maximizing location.
Schmidheiny and Bru¨lhart (2011) generalize this result under the same assumptions as
in Ortega and Peri (2013), so that the model to be estimated becomes:
mjk =
exp
xjk ′β + ln(sj) + τ ln(∑
l∈D
exjl
′β/τ
)
− ln
exjj ′β +
 ∑
l∈D/{j}
exjl
′β/τ
τ+ ln(ηjk)

(10)
PPML estimation of (10) delivers the same estimate for β/τ as the estimation of an
individual-level nested logit model, with the nest structure that we just described (Schmid-
heiny and Bru¨lhart, 2011). Observe that the origin fixed effects suffice to restore indepen-
dence across observations both in (9) and (10), although the stochastic properties of the
two underlying RUM models differ.17 This, in turn, implies that PPML estimation is al-
ways characterized by a fundamental uncertainty about the magnitude of the elasticity of
migration flows, which is connected to the inability to identify τ .
3.1 Consistency with more general RUM models
Schmidheiny and Bru¨lhart (2011) established the consistency of the PPML estimation with
an utility-maximizing behavior of the migrants under the same assumption on the stochastic
properties of the RUM model used in Ortega and Peri (2013). Here, we go one step further,
showing that the same consistency characterizes the estimation of (8), which we derived from
(4). We reproduce here (8):
mjk = exp
(
αj + xjk
′β/τ + γjb(k) + ln(ηjk)
)
16Guimaraes et al. (2003) focus on location-decisions taken from a single origin, so that α does not vary
with j; Guimaraes et al. (2004) show that, with multiple time periods, the inclusion of origin-time dummies
suffices to restore the parallel between the conditional logit and Poisson.
17The key is that the term describing the expected utility from migration to any destination in the nest
D/{j} does not vary across destinations, so that it is absorbed by the origin fixed effect, which is always to
be included in the estimation (Guimaraes et al., 2004).
Etudes et Documents n° 27, CERDI, 2014
16
PPML estimation requires observations to be cross-sectionally independent and, as dis-
cussed in Guimaraes et al. (2004), this can be achieved with the inclusion of a richer structure
of dummies. Specifically, the inclusion of origin-nest dummies suffices to control for γjb(k),
and restore cross-sectional independence of the residuals.18 This, in turn, will produce a
consistent estimate of β/τ , which is identified only out of within-nest variation.
Such an approach requires to specify the assumptions on the nests b, and it is feasible
thanks to the absence of an incidental parameter problem in the estimation of a Poisson
model (Trivedi and Munkin, 2010). The estimation delivers the same estimate for β/τ as
the individual-level estimation of a nested logit model with location-specific regressors.
The choice of nests b is a data-dependent empirical exercise with a clear trade-off. As
the number of nests used to specify equation (8) increases, the available variability that can
be exploited to estimate β/τ goes down. On the other hand, choosing a too parsimonious
specification with few nests may not be able to fully restore the cross-sectional independence
of the residuals that is needed to be able to interpret the coefficients of the model as coming
from a RUM framework. In able to assess this trade-off, the next subsection introduces a
test of the cross-sectional dependence of the residuals in equation (8).
3.2 Tests for spatial dependence of the residuals
The spatial independence of the migration flows from a given origin to different destinations
can be assessed through tests on the residuals generated by the various specifications of our
estimates. Specifically, let ejk represent the Pearson residual associated to the migration
flow from the origin j to the destination k,19 and ek be the vector of Pearson residuals for
destination k. If the set of fixed effects introduced among the regressors suffices to restore
spatial independence, then we should have E(ek
′el) = 0 for l 6= k, while the presence of a
nest-specific stochastic component of utility would entail that E(ek
′el) > 0 if b(l) = b(k).
As the RUM model gives us an expectation on the direction of the correlation if we do not
have cross-sectional independence, we can adapt a modified version of the CD test proposed
18A similar use of nests can be found in the analysis of firms’ location choice by Head et al. (1995) and
Levinson (1996); see also the other papers cited by Guimaraes et al. (2004).
19Hsiao et al. (2012) provide evidence on the reliability of the Pearson residuals when testing for cross-
sectional dependence in non-linear models.
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by Pesaran (2004).20 Let ρ̂kl denote the correlation between the vectors ek and el; the CD
test statistic is given by:
CD =
(
2no
nd(nd − 1)
)1/2 nd−1∑
k=1
nd∑
l=k+1
ρ̂kl (11)
where no and nd represent respectively the number of origins and destinations in the
dataset. Under the null of no cross-sectional correlation in the residuals, the CD test statistic
is asymptotically distributed as a standard Normal variable.
In the empirical part of the paper, we will use the CD statistic to choose a model that
is parsimonious enough while being able to restore the cross-sectional independence of the
residuals in equation (8).
4 Data
4.1 Data sources
We draw our data from three main sources. The first one is Docquier et al. (2009), who
provide information on the size of bilateral migration stocks of individuals aged 25 and
above in 31 countries of destination in 1990 and 2000. This dataset provides a proxy for the
scale of gross migration flows that is represented by the variation in stocks,21 a proxy that
has been used, inter alia, by Beine et al. (2011).
Bilateral migrant stocks are defined on the basis of country of birth for all but five
destinations (Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan and Korea), which resort to citizenship to
identify immigrants. This dataset is based on census and register data and it might fail
to capture undocumented migrants; if visa waivers do offer an option for a legal admission
at destination for undocumented migrants, then this measurement error in the dependent
variable would go against finding a significant relationship between bilateral visa policies and
20“The choice of the appropriate test should be supported by a priori information (e.g. from economic
theory) on the way statistical units may be correlated” (Moscone and Tosetti, 2009, p. 558), and this is
why we are not concerned here with the fact that the CD test might fail to reject the null of cross-sectional
independence when the data present both patterns of positive and negative correlation (Frees, 1995).
21This is a common practice in the migration literature, which implies that “it is impossible to know
how exactly these changes balance attrition (and whether attrition is caused by death, return migration or
emigration to a third country) and new entry flows.” (Docquier and Rapoport, 2012, p. 725).
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the scale of gross migration flows.22 The data by Docquier et al. (2009) are matched with
the ones assembled by Ozden et al. (2011), giving us the size of bilateral migration stocks in
1960, which will be used as an instrument for the size of networks in 1990.
With respect to bilateral visa policies, we use the dataset by Neumayer (2006), which
is based on the Travel Information Manual, a monthly publication of the International Air
Transport Association, IATA. The Travel Information Manual contains information on all
the legal requirements related to transit or non-immigration admission into all countries
of the world, including visa requirements. Neumayer (2006) built a dichotomous variable
signaling whether the citizens of country j are requested to have a visa for entering into
country k or they benefit from a visa waiver.23 Observe that visa policies are based on
citizenship rather than on country of birth, which is the basis for the migration data provided
by 26 out of 31 destination countries in Docquier et al. (2009); the measurement error induced
by this discrepancy is likely to be negligible as citizenship and country of birth are likely to
coincide for the vast majority of the population in each origin country. This dataset, which
has been used also in Neumayer (2010, 2011) and Perkins and Neumayer (2013), refers to
December 2004.24 As we will be using the information contained in this dataset to estimate
the determinants of migration flows between 1990 and 2000, this introduces an additional
source of measurement error related to the changes in visa policies that might have occurred
between our period of analysis and 2004, but “this measurement error is small because the
number of changes to visa restrictions is likely to be very small compared to the total number
of restrictions in place” (Neumayer, 2010, p. 173).25
We also draw on Mayer and Zignago (2011) for the time-invariant dyadic variables such
as distance, common language, colonial relationship and contiguity, which can influence
bilateral migration costs.
22Notice that although a visa overstayer becomes an undocumented immigrant after the expiry of the
period for which admission was granted, the overstayer might have been regularized by the time of the
following population census if the destination country adopts an amnesty for undocumented migrants.
23Visas that need not to be requested before traveling are considered as visa waivers, as a visa that can be
obtained upon arrival “typically does not represent any restriction at all because the procedure of getting it
is extremely simple and does not involve any major check on the applicant.” (Neumayer, 2010, p. 173).
24We repeatedly contacted the customer service of the IATA to obtain earlier editions of the manual, but
regrettably the December 2004 edition is the oldest that is currently available.
25We can also observe that a similar measurement error occurs in Grogger and Hanson (2011), who include
the bilateral visa policies in 1999 among the determinants of the size of bilateral migration stocks in 2000.
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4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the variables that will be used in the estimation
below. The first panel presents the full dataset of 31-destinations-times-182-origins dyads
while the second focuses on those observations for which the variation in bilateral migration
stocks between 1990 and 2000 takes strictly positive values. The sample size goes down
from 5,611 origin-destination observations to just 3,466, fully dropping three destinations:
Hungary, Korea and Poland.26 Thus, 62 percent of the observations remain for OLS regres-
sions on the logarithm of the bilateral migration rate. The largest increase in the bilateral
stock (3.7 million) corresponds to the Mexican migration to the US whereas the minimum
(-189,660) refers to the decline of the stock of German migrants in the US. Incidentally, only
7 percent of the observations take negative values, which means that the share of strict zeros
is 31 percent. The average value is less than 3,000 immigrants per origin-destination pair
in the total sample and it goes up to more than 5,000 immigrants in the strictly positive
sample. The standard deviations are in both cases notably larger than the means (52,910
and 66,991 respectively), pointing out to a high level of dispersion in the data.
The first independent variable in Table 1 is the size of migration networks for each origin-
destination pair in the year 1990. The average in this case is over 7,000 immigrants with
a maximum of 2.7 million corresponding again to the Mexican network in the US. On the
lower end, up to one third of the sample corresponds to zero values in the first panel, number
reduced to just 6 percent in the lower panel. Some of the regressions in the Appendix also use
the 1960 size of the networks. In this case, the average is lower (5,867 immigrants) although
the maximum is still quite high, corresponding this time to the 2.2 million Polish-origin
individuals living in Germany. The number of zeros in this variable is 35 percent in the full
sample and 21 percent in the lower panel.
Next, the dummy variable representing the visa requirement to enter a given destination
from a given origin has an average value of 0.69 in the full sample and a slightly lower
0.67 in the lower panel. Thus, its variability does not hinge on the inclusion of zero-flow
observations in the sample. These figures suggest that, on average, the citizens of the origin
26The size of the 1990 migrant stock are estimated rather than observed for 10 destination countries,
including Hungary, Korea and Poland (Docquier et al., 2009, p. 317), and this introduces an additional mea-
surement error in the variable; more specifically, the size of the estimated stocks for these three destinations
are higher for all origin countries than observed stocks in 2000.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Full sample (5,611 observations)
mean st. dev. min max zeros
Immigration flows, 1990-2000 2,905 52,910 -189,660 3,718,828 0.31
Migration networks in 1990 7,213 55,022 0 2,655,997 0.33
Migration networks in 1960 5,867 55,648 0 2,226,485 0.35
Visa requirement 0.69 0.46 0 1
Schengen countries during the 1990s 0.01 0.11 0 1
Colonial links 0.03 0.18 0 1
Common language 0.11 0.31 0 1
Distance (km.) 7,212 4,297 59.62 19,586.18
Positive variations in stocks (3,466 observations)
mean st. dev. min max zeros
Immigration flows, 1990-2000 5,173 66,991 1 3,718,828 0.00
Migration networks in 1990 8,057 59,421 0 2,655,997 0.06
Migration networks in 1960 5,112 51,212 0 2,226,485 0.21
Visa requirement 0.67 0.47 0 1
Schengen countries during the 1990s 0.02 0.13 0 1
Colonial links 0.04 0.20 0 1
Common language 0.14 0.35 0 1
Distance (km.) 6,690 4,309 60.00 19,586.18
Sources: Authors’ elaboration on Docquier et al. (2009) for flows and migration networks
in 1990; Ozden et al. (2011) for migration networks in 1960; Neumayer (2006) for the visa
requirement, and Mayer and Zignago (2011) for the rest of the variables.
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countries in our sample require a visa to be admitted in 69 percent of the destinations; this
average hides considerable variability across origins, as revealed by Figure 1. As mentioned
in the introduction, the opportunities for non-immigrant admission at destination are highly
polarized, with 64 countries facing a visa requirement in all countries in our sample, and 13
countries benefiting from a visa waiver in all destinations.
Figure 1: Distribution of the countries of origin by visa regime
Source: authors’ elaboration on Neumayer (2006).
The following variable in Table 1 refers to the Schengen treaty. It takes value 1 when
both the origin and the destination country belonged to the Schengen area at some point
in the 1990s and 0 otherwise. The members of the Schengen area (9 of the 31 destination
countries in this period) adopted a common visa policy towards any origin country in our
sample in 2004,27 so that the inclusion of this variable, which is introduced following the
main specification in Beine et al. (2011), could, if anything, limit the ability of the models
below to identify the effect of the visa variable.28 Finally, three other classical variables from
the literature are presented: colonial links, the existence of a common language and the
distance in kilometers between each origin and each destination. None of the three appears
27This was not the case in earlier years; for instance, Spain granted a visa waiver to Colombians up to 2001
and to Ecuadorians up to 2003, when a visa requirement was imposed by the European Council regulation
(Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga, 2013).
28In fact, the results below are not sensitive to the exclusion of the Schengen variable.
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very different in the two samples.
5 Estimation results
We present first the estimates of the various specifications that we run, and we then discuss
the interpretation of the coefficients following the lines proposed in Section 3.
5.1 Estimates
This section presents the results from estimating several versions of the model introduced
in Section 2. In order to closely tie the results to the existing literature, we begin by
reproducing the OLS estimation in Beine et al. (2011) in the first data column in Table
2. The specification is exactly the same as in Beine et al. (2011) but for the addition of
the visa requirement variable introduced in the previous section. It includes both origin and
destination country dummies. The inclusion of origin dummies suffices to make the estimates
consistent with an underlying RUM model as in Ortega and Peri (2013), and it controls for
all origin-specific push factors of bilateral migration flows. The inclusion of destination
dummies absorbs destination-specific pull factors and general immigration policies as those
considered by Mayda (2010). Origin and destination fixed effects also allow us to control
for the dependency of current bilateral migration flows on the future attractiveness of all
destinations, as discussed in Bertoli et al. (2013a). Hence, the structure of dummies included
among the regressors entails that we can only identify the effects of dyadic variables, with
migration networks and bilateral visa policies representing the two key variables of interest.29
The inclusion of origin dummies entails that the identifying variation for the effect of the
bilateral visa policy comes from the 105 origin countries in our sample that face different
visa regimes across the 31 destinations that we include in the analysis.
Reassuringly, this specification produces the same results as in Beine et al. (2011) for all of
the variables that they also included. Distance, colonial links and common language appear
as significant correlates of the log of immigration rates. In particular, the coefficient on the
log of networks in 1990 exactly coincides with that in Beine et al. (2011): a highly significant
0.62. The introduction of the visa requirement variable as an additional explanatory variable
29We follow Beine et al. (2011) in adding one to the size of the 1990 migration networks so as not to
discard zero observations.
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Table 2: Determinants of migration flows (1990-2000)
Specification (1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable ln(flow) flow flow
Model OLS PPML PPML
ln(networks+1) 0.621*** 0.658*** 0.567***
[0.018] [0.042] [0.049]
Visa requirement -0.051 0.017 -0.667***
[0.106] [0.161] [0.215]
Schengen 0.278 0.651* 0.034
[0.179] [0.381] [0.235]
Colony 0.313** -0.290 0.451*
[0.137] [0.217] [0.256]
Common language 0.420*** 0.333** 0.302*
[0.076] [0.130] [0.161]
ln(distance) -0.396*** -0.382*** -0.121
[0.046] [0.098] [0.116]
Destination fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Origin fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Origin*nest fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 3,466 5,611 5,611
Adjusted (pseudo) R2 0.867 0.988 0.996
Log pseudo-likelihood - -4,294,695 -2,213,844
Pesaran (2004) CD test - 17.35 -1.57
p-value - 0.000 0.117
Note: standard errors in brackets; *** significant at the 99
percent level, ** significant at the 95 percent level, * signifi-
cant at the 90 percent level. The dependent variable in specifi-
cations (2)-(3) is equal to the maximum between the variation
in stocks and zero; standard errors are robust in specifications
(1) to (3); the pseudo R2 for specifications (2)-(3) is defined as
one minus the ratio between the log-likelihood of the model
over the log-likelihood of a restricted model which only in-
cludes a constant.
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does not have any effect on the rest of parameters, and the variable itself shows as non-
significant.
This specification might be exposed to an inconsistency with the assumptions on the
stochastic component of location-specific utility in the underlying RUM model. If the vector
of regressors xjk, which we augmented with the inclusion of bilateral visa policies, fails to
include all relevant dyadic determinants of migration or if some observed factors have an het-
erogeneous impact across potential migrants, then this would introduce correlation between
the realizations of the stochastic component of location-specific utility. This, in turn, would
give rise to multilateral resistance to migration (Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga,
2013), with the elements of xjk being correlated with the error term, and with the bilateral
migration rate between j and k being still dependent on the attractiveness of destinations
other than k. While in principle one could address this concern by testing whether the resid-
uals are characterized by cross-sectional dependence, the highly unbalanced structure of the
dataset, which is caused by the exclusion of observations with non-positive flows, hinders
the adoption of these tests (De Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006).
The second key problem with the OLS specification is precisely the need to discard non-
positive values,30 which can bias the estimated coefficients (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006,
2011). This problem can be directly dealt with by using the Poisson regression model on
the full sample from Table 1.31 Specification (2) in Table 2 shows the result from running
a Poisson regression on exactly the same variables as in specification (1). The estimates in
specifications (1) and (2) are very similar,32 with just two minor changes. PPML estima-
tion makes the colonial variable become insignificant whereas the Schengen variable turns
marginally significant. The visa requirement variable is still insignificant in this specification.
The RUM-consistency of the Poisson estimates depends, as discussed in Section 3, on
the absence of cross-sectional dependence in the error term. The presence of cross-sectional
dependence in the residuals would imply that the coefficients from specification (2) in Table 2
30We also estimated the model with scaled-OLS, as in Ortega and Peri (2013); the coefficient of the visa
variable is insignificant also in this case. Results available from the authors upon request.
31For the purposes of estimation, the 7 percent of negative values are set to zero, as variations in bilateral
stocks are used as a proxy for unobserved gross flows, which are nonnegative by definition.
32We report robust standard errors for specification (2), which, as demonstrated by Gourieroux et al.
(1984), make the estimates from the Poisson regression consistent even when the data are not characterized
by the equality between mean and variance; the test on the residuals proposed by Cameron and Trivedi
(2010) reveals that the equi-dispersion property is indeed not satisfied by our model.
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cannot be interpreted as being consistent with the underlying RUM model. In this case, they
should be rather seen as the outcome of an atheoretical specification. To check whether this
is the case, we computed the CD statistic for specification (2) using the xtcd Stata command
introduced by Eberhardt (2011). Table 2 shows a statistic of 17.35, which strongly rejects
the null of cross-sectional independence.
5.1.1 Reducing cross-sectional dependence
The approach that we adopt here is to restore cross-sectional independence by reducing the
variability in the data that is used for identification. Specifically, the inclusion of origin-nest
dummies allows us to control for unobservable nest-specific components of location-specific
utility that have a differential impact on potential migrants from different countries of ori-
gin. This approach is not demanding in terms of data requirements, but it needs to specify
assumptions about the composition of the nests of destinations that share unobserved com-
ponents of location-specific utility.33 Why is there a need to specify assumptions, rather
than opting for a systematic exploration of all alternative nest structures of the 31 desti-
nations in our sample? The answer is represented by the Bell number Bn, which gives the
number of possible partitions of a set of n elements: for a set of 31 elements we have that
B31 ≈ 5.4 × 1023,34 so that a systematic exploration of all alternative nest structures is
computationally unfeasible. Bonhomme and Manresa (2012) recently proposed an approach
that leads to an optimal (in terms of fit rather than cross-sectional dependence) partition of
the units of analysis into non-overlapping nests for the estimation of a linear model. Their
approach could in principle be extended to nonlinear models (page 10) but, as they acknowl-
edge, the properties of such an estimator are yet to be studied and are out of the scope of
this paper.
The adequacy of a partition of the destination countries into nests can be gauged by
its ability to restore the cross-sectional independence of the residuals of the model. There
is a clear trade-off between the fineness of the nests and the loss of identification power.
33See, for instance, the discussion on the composition of the nests in Head et al. (1995).
34The Bell number is defined in a recursive way as follows:
Bn+1 =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
Bn
with B0 = 1.
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Coarser nests, with the unique nest of destinations a` la Ortega and Peri (2013) representing
the limiting case of coarseness, have more identification power at the expense of a greater
risk of an incorrect specification. Finer nests, like the ones presented here, run the risk of
saturating the model and losing much of the identification power in the data. In the limit,
the finest partition, which is represented by single-destination nests, ensures cross-sectional
independence but delivers no identification in the cross section as it would be equivalent to
origin-destination dyadic fixed effects.
This trade-off leads us to propose the following approach: if the CD test rejects the null
of cross-sectional independence on the basis of a specification with m ≥ 1 nests, then we opt
for a specification with m+1 nests. This requires us to determine the criteria that inform how
we define finer nests, and we opted for geographical proximity of the destinations and income
per capita as the two guiding factors. We stop once the nest structure produces residuals
that do not lead to the rejection, at conventional confidence levels, of the null hypothesis
of cross-sectional independence, with the sign or significance of the estimated coefficients
being irrelevant for this stopping rule. The sequence of estimates that we obtained under
progressively finer partitions of the set of destinations D is reported in Table A.1 in the
Appendix A.
As the CD test conducted on the residuals from specification (2) in Table 2 where m = 1
rejected the null, we opted for a specification with two nests, the nest b1 including Europe
and the nest b2 including all the other destinations. This specification reduced the CD test
to 5.52, but it still leads to reject the null of cross-sectional independence at the 1 percent
confidence level. We then divided the nest b2 into a nest b21 containing high-income countries
(Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the US), and a nest b22 for emerging countries
(Korea, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey). This specification with m = 3 generated a CD
statistic of 3.92, still rejecting at the 1 percent confidence level.35 The following step was to
split the nest b21 between a nest b211 for North America (Canada and the US) and a nest
b212 for the other countries, but this only reduced the value of the CD test to 3.82 (p-value
of 0.000). We then divided the large European nest b1 between the nest b11 for Western
European countries and a nest b12 for Eastern European countries. The value of the CD
statistic went further down with this five-nest specification to 3.30, but it sill rejected the
null at the 1 percent confidence level.
35Notice that the coefficient of the visa variable is negative and significant in this specification.
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Finally, we ran a six-nests specification, further dividing the Western European nest into
a nest b111 for the EU-15 countries, and a nest b112 for the three members of the European
Free Trade Association, namely Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Here we stopped, as the
residuals generated from this specification of the model no longer led to a rejection of the
null. Specification (3) in Table 2 reports the estimates,36 obtained after adding controls that
interact the origin dummies with the nest dummies, so that the coefficients are identified
only out of within-nest variability in the data.
As discussed above, this identification strategy works under the assumption that the
unobserved components of location-specific utility that induce a cross-sectional correlation
in the error term are nest-specific, with the destinations belonging to any of the six nests
regarded as close substitutes by potential migrants. Their location choices within each nest
are more sensitive than the decision to migrate to variations in the attractiveness of any
other destinations in the nest.
The loss of identification power is reflected in the lack of precision in the estimates for the
Schengen and distance variables.37 On the other hand, the colonial and common language
variables become marginally significant. The migration networks variable remains highly
significant although the value of the coefficient falls in this specification: 0.567. This fall is
what we could expect from the existence of a problem of multilateral resistance to migration
that is addressed by the use of the appropriate nest structure. The reason is that a larger
network from one origin to a particular destination will be typically correlated with lower
networks to destinations that are perceived as substitutes. In a specification, such as (1)
36The origin dummies are interacted with the following six nests: b111 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom), b112 (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland), b12 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and
Slovakia), b211 (Canada and the US), b212 (Australia, Japan and New Zealand) and b22 (Korea, Mexico,
South Africa, and Turkey). All of our results are robust to the exclusion of the last nest. Notice that our
estimation approach does not require that other destinations that are not included in our sample do not
belong to these six nests. For instance, Romania could belong to the Eastern European nest b12, or Brazil
could belong to the nest b22 of emerging countries.
37The instability of the estimated coefficient for distance is not related to its correlation with the visa
variable. Although the raw correlation between the two stands at 0.25, suggesting that distance to the
destination country is positively correlated with the imposition of a visa requirement, this correlation declines
to 0.04 once we partial out origin and destination fixed effects and to 0.03 after partialling out origin-nest
fixed effects, so that multicollinearity cannot explain the change in the significance of distance.
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and (2) in Table 2, that does not adequately control for multilateral resistance to migration,
as shown by the test on the residuals, the network variable might be picking up the own
larger network effect together with the other destinations lower network effects, leading to
an upward bias in the coefficient, which appears to be limited in this case.
Still, the most notable change in specification (3) in Table 2 relates to the coefficient
of the visa variable, which turns highly significant with a value of -0.667. The economic
interpretation of the observed change is clear: visa policies toward any origin are closely cor-
related across destinations, as evidenced by Figure 1. This confirms one of the assumptions
in the model by Giordani and Ruta (2013). The correlation in policies, in turn, introduces
a correlation between the bilateral visa policy adopted by country k and the attractiveness
of alternative destinations for potential migrants from country j. Once we account for the
attractiveness of alternative destinations through the inclusion of origin-nest dummies, bi-
lateral visa policies become significant determinants of the scale of bilateral migration flows.
This change in the estimated effect of visa policies once multilateral resistance to migration
is controlled for is in line with the results found by Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga
(2013) for Spain.
Are the results in specification (3) preferable to those in specification (2) in terms of
their RUM-consistency? They are, since the CD test performed on the residuals from
specification (3) does not, by construction, reject the null of spatial independence, as the
value of the statistic stands at -1.57 (p-value of 0.117). The much larger value of the log
pseudo-likelihood function with respect to specification (2) also represents another reason
to favor specification (3), as pointed out by Guimaraes et al. (2004). A remaining threat to
identification would be represented by the existence of differences in dyadic unobservables
within a nest. For example, in the presence of reverse causality, with destinations requiring
visas whenever migration flows from an origin are high, we would expect the magnitude of
our coefficient to be downward biased.38 This might suggest that our estimate of the visa
effect might indeed be downward biased, though our estimation approach already greatly
reduces the concerns related to unobservables, accounting for their influence on the pattern of
correlation in the stochastic component of utility. The robustness checks presented in Section
6 below allow us to further reduce the empirical relevance of these legitimate concerns.
38Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013), who can control for time-varying dyadic unobservables
thanks to the frequency and to the longitudinal dimension of their data, find a larger effect of visa policies
on migration flows to Spain.
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5.2 Uncertainty on the elasticities
Once we have an estimation technique that is well micro-founded and thus consistent with
the theory, such as the one presented in specification (3) in Table 2, our objective is to
provide an economic interpretation of the estimates. The difficulty here is that Table 2 gives
us estimates for β/τ whereas we are unable to separately identify the elements of the vector
β and τ , with τ entering separately in the expressions for the elasticities provided in Section
2.1.2 above.
Following the approach adopted in Schmidheiny and Bru¨lhart (2011), we can define
bounds for the two elasticities, conditional upon the estimated value of β̂/τ , exploiting their
monotonicity in τ . Specifically, computing the direct elasticity for τ converging to 0 and for
τ = 1, we can observe that:39
∂ ln(mjk)
∂ ln(Vjk)
∣∣∣
β/τ=β̂/τ
=
(
(1− pjk|b(k))x′jkβ̂/τ , (1− pjk)x′jkβ̂/τ
]
(12)
Similarly, with respect to the indirect elasticity, we can define the following interval:
∂ ln(mjk)
∂ ln(Vjl)
∣∣∣
β/τ=β̂/τ
=
(
− pjk|b(k)x′jkβ̂/τ ,−pjkx′jkβ̂/τ
]
(13)
The indirect elasticity in (13) represents an externality. We are measuring the effect of
factors related to the attractiveness of an alternative destination l, included in Vjl, on the
migration flows not between j and l but between j and k. Whenever one of this factors is
the migration policy set by l on the potential migrants coming from j, we will be quantifying
the externality effect of migration policies.
5.2.1 Network elasticities
Calculating the bounds of the elasticity of migration flows with respect to the size of the
networks is a straightforward task. We just need to follow equations (12) and (13) for the
direct and indirect elasticity respectively. The summary statistics for the upper and lower
bound of this direct elasticity can be observed in the upper panel of Table 3, while each
dot in Figure 2 represents the two bounds for an origin-destination dyad. Since we chose
to represent the lower bounds in the horizontal axis, this implies automatically that all the
39Without loss of generality, we have ordered the extremes of the two intervals under the assumption that
x′jkβ̂/τ ≥ 0.
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observations are above the 45 degree line. The figure shows how the upper bound tends
to be quite similar for most countries. The reason is that the upper bound depends on
unconditional probabilities of emigration which, for most countries, count for a fairly small
share of the total population. On the contrary, the lower bound depends on conditional
probabilities of migration within the nest which, for many countries, are quite substantial.
All in all, Table 3 shows that the average upper bound is 0.57, with this figure coinciding with
the estimated coefficient. On the other extreme, under a high correlation in the unobserved
component of utility between destinations of the same nest, the average lower bound for the
elasticity of migration with respect to networks would stand at 0.46.
Table 3: Direct and indirect elasticities of networks and visa
Bound lower upper
Networks
Direct effect 0.459 0.567
(0.156) (0.002)
Indirect effect -0.108 0.000
(0.156) (0.002)
Visa
Direct effect -0.473 -0.399
(0.045) (0.131)
Indirect effect 0.028 0.169
(0.088) (0.245)
Note: standard deviations in
parentheses. The bounds corre-
spond to averages, weighted by
population at origin, over equa-
tions (12), (13) and (B.1)-(B.3)
based on the estimates in speci-
fication (3) in Table 2.
The heterogeneity of the results does not stop at the direct elasticities. Our simple
RUM migration model also has implications for the cross-elasticity. Equation (13) generates
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Figure 2: Bounds for the direct elasticity of migration flows with respect to networks
Note: see Table 3 for the average values.
the bounds for the cross-elasticity that has typically been absent from the literature:40 the
elasticity of the migration flow from the origin j to the destination k with respect to the
migration networks of j in another country l ∈ b(k). The upper panel of Table 3 presents the
averages of the upper and lower bound for this cross-elasticity, while Figure 3 represents the
clouds of dyad-specific cross-elasticities.41 The average upper bound for the cross-elasticity is
almost zero. As for the lower bound, which corresponds to the largest within-nest correlation,
the average cross-elasticity is higher in absolute value: -0.11.42
40Bertoli et al. (2013b) represent an exception in this respect.
41We only report here and in the next section within-nest cross-elasticities. Observe that (13) does not
vary with l ∈ b(k), so that we have the same number of direct and cross-elasticities. The cross-elasticity with
a country out of the nest is not subject to uncertainty and it is just given by the upper bounds in Figure 3.
42Notice that, logically, the instances of very large (in absolute value) lower bound cross-elasticities cor-
respond to instances of very low lower bound direct elasticities, as the difference between (12) and (13)
is independent from τ . For instance, the lowest upper bounds in Figures 2 and 3 correspond both to the
Grenada-US dyad, and the difference between the upper bounds for any pair of points that correspond to
any origin-destination dyads in the two figures is always 0.567, which corresponds to the estimated coefficient
for networks in Table 2.
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Figure 3: Bounds for the indirect elasticity of migration flows with respect to networks
Note: see Table 3 for the average values.
5.2.2 Visa effects
Differently from networks, the visa variable is dichotomous, so that we adjusted the formulas
presented in Section 3 to account for the discrete nature of this variable, as shown in the
Appendix B. The bottom panel of Table 3 presents the averages of these effects implied by
the point estimates taken out of specification (3) in Table 2.
The most remarkable aspect that deserves to be commented about the direct and indi-
rect effects of visas is their magnitude. The average bounds mean that we can expect the
imposition of a visa requirement by country k on country j to correlate with a decrease of
40 to 47 percent of the level of migration flows from j to k with respect to the level that
prevails when a visa waiver is applied.43 We can recall from the Introduction that Pritchett
(2006) argued that host-country policies could be decreasing migration flows by a factor of
two to five; Table 3 shows is that visas might be a big part of that “cliff at the border,”
being able to almost halve migration flows by themselves.
As it was the case with network elasticities, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in
the visa effects. The full extent of this heterogeneity can be observed in Figure 4, which
43Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013) estimate that the introduction of a visa requirement
reduces bilateral migration flows to Spain by up to 76 percent.
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represents the whole range of visa effects calculated for each origin-destination pair. The
concentration of points in the lower part of the triangle explains the relatively high level of
the visa effect bounds (in absolute value).
Figure 4: Bounds for the direct effect of the visa requirement on migration flows
Note: see Table 3 for the average values.
The requirement of a visa from country k to the citizens of country j also has effects on
the migration flows going to alternative destinations, that is, it creates an externality. The
bottom panel of Table 3 presents the average values that quantify this externality whereas
Figure 5 represents all of the visa cross-effects bounds for each origin-destination dyad. As
in the previous section, the cross-effects are the inverse image of the direct effects. The
magnitude of the average bounds ranges between 3 and 17 percent, describing the size of the
increase in migration flows from j to l generated by the imposition of a visa requirement by a
third country k upon the citizens of j. To our knowledge, these calculated bounds represent
the first measure of the possible magnitude of migration policy externalities, that is, the
effect of the migration policy of one destination on the migration flows going to another
destination. The implication is that countries whose visa policies may have a small effect on
the migration flows going out of a particular country may, on the contrary, generate large
effects on the migration flows from that particular country to an alternative destination.
For instance, consider Canada, which received little more than 12,000 migrants from
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Figure 5: Bounds for the indirect effect of the visa requirement on migration flows
Note: see Table 3 for the average values.
Mexico between 1990 and 2000; our estimates suggest that this bilateral flow is highly sen-
sitive to the policies adopted in the US, which represent the largest destination for Mexican
migrants. The estimated indirect effect of the US visa policy on Mexicans upon the migration
flow from Mexico to Canada range between 90 and 91 percent of the actual flow. This figure
is much larger than the direct effect of the Canadian visa policy toward Mexicans, which
is estimated at minus 48 percent: hence, the flow of Mexicans to Canada would respond
less to a change in the Canadian visa policy than to a change in the US visa policy toward
Mexicans.
6 Robustness
This section presents a number of robustness analyses on the main results presented in
specification (3) of Table 2. First, we address the concern that our estimates of the effect of
visa policies could be confounded by the unobserved cultural proximity between the origin
and the destination country. Second, we tackle the concerns related to the measurement
error in the visa variable, using data on gross migration flows to a subset of 15 destinations
over 2005 and 2006 from Ortega and Peri (2013). Third, we re-estimate the models with
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different samples. Fourth, we redefine the dependent variable in order to analyze separately
the determinants of low and high-skill migration. Fifth, we propose an approach to deal
with the potential endogeneity problem related to the inclusion of the networks variable.
6.1 Cultural proximity
Our interpretation of the estimated coefficient for the visa requirement in our benchmark
specification is that this variable indirectly reveals the height of the policy-induced “cliff at
the border,” as legal provisions for non-immigrant admission should exert no influence on
the size of bilateral migration flows in the absence of severe restrictions on labor mobility
across countries. An alternative interpretation of the estimated effect of visa policies is that it
could actually be driven by the correlation between this variable and the (for us, unobserved)
cultural proximity between countries: destination countries could be more likely to grant a
visa waiver to the citizens of culturally close origin countries, with cultural proximity also
exerting a direct influence on the scale of bilateral migration flows (Belot and Ederveen,
2012), so that our estimates would be picking up this spurious correlation.
The data by Neumayer (2006) give us a nice opportunity to deal with this relevant
threat to identification, using data on the reciprocal visa policy: we can model the bilateral
migration flow from country j to country k as a function of the visa requirement imposed
by the origin country j on the citizens of country k. The underlying idea is that, say, the
visa policy adopted by Ghana towards British citizens should have no impact on the scale
of migration from Ghana to the United Kingdom, but this variable might be capturing the
effect of cultural proximity between the two countries.44
Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 4 reveal that the reciprocal visa requirement is, as
expected, negative but only marginally significant when we control for multilateral resistance
to migration through the inclusion of origin-nest fixed effects. More interestingly, specifica-
tions (3) and (4) in Table 4 add the reciprocal visa policy to our benchmark specification: the
estimated coefficient for the visa requirement imposed from the destination k to the origin
j is virtually unaffected by the inclusion of the reciprocal visa policy, and it is negative and
44Once we partial out the correlation with the other regressors, the correlation between the visa policy
of country k on j and the visa policy of country j on k stands at 0.23 (the correlation in the raw data
stands at 0.62), so that the estimated effect of the reciprocal visa policy could also be reflecting this positive
correlation.
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Table 4: Determinants of migration flows (reciprocal visa policy)
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable flow flow flow flow
Model PPML PPML PPML PPML
ln(networks+1) 0.658*** 0.560*** 0.658*** 0.563***
[0.042] [0.050] [0.042] [0.050]
Visa requirement - - 0.017 -0.639***
- - [0.160] [0.211]
Reciprocal visa requirement 0.017 -0.463* 0.016 -0.436*
[0.304] [0.253] [0.302] [0.256]
Schengen 0.653* 0.057 0.651* 0.041
[0.379] [0.233] [0.381] [0.235]
Colony -0.292 0.464* -0.291 0.451*
[0.221] [0.253] [0.221] [0.255]
Common language 0.332** 0.305* 0.333** 0.298*
[0.130] [0.161] [0.131] [0.160]
ln(distance) -0.381*** -0.130 -0.382*** -0.123
[0.099] [0.116] [0.099] [0.114]
Destination fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin*nest fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,611 5,611 5,611 5,611
Pseudo R2 0.988 0.996 0.988 0.996
Log pseudo-likelihood -4,294,724 -2,218,243 -4,294,666 -2,202,439
Pesaran (2004) CD test 17.35 -1.30 17.34 -1.70
p-value 0.000 0.193 0.000 0.089
Note: standard errors in brackets; *** significant at the 99 percent level, **
significant at the 95 percent level, * significant at the 90 percent level. The
dependent variable is equal to the maximum between the variation in stocks
and zero; standard errors are robust; the nest structure in specifications (2)
and (4) is the same as in specification (3) in Table 2; the pseudo R2 is
defined as one minus the ratio between the log-likelihood of the model over
the log-likelihood of a restricted model which only includes a constant.
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highly statistically significant in the specification that restores the cross-sectional indepen-
dence of the residuals. This is reassuring about the ability of the visa policy to provide us
with information about the height of the “cliff at the border,” as the estimated effect of the
visa requirement does not appear to be driven by unobserved cultural proximity between
countries.
6.2 Measurement error in the visa variable
Our visa variable refers to December 2004, while our proxy for gross migration flows has been
measured between 1990 and 2000: this timing creates the concern that the measurement error
in the visa variable could be systematically correlated with the dependent variable in our
econometric analysis. Specifically, destination countries that used to grant a visa waivers
to some origins in the 1990s and that faced a substantial immigration of visa over-stayers
might have then imposed a visa requirement. This was, for instance, the case for Spain,
which lifted the visa waiver that it used to grant to Colombian and Ecuadorian citizens in
2001 and 2003, after experiencing substantial immigration flows in the late 1990s from these
two origin countries (Bertoli et al., 2011; Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga, 2013). This
type of policy change would clearly bias the estimated effect of visa requirements towards
zero.
We deal this challenge by drawing on the data on yearly gross migration flows to 15 OECD
countries by Ortega and Peri (2013) for the years 2005 and 2006.45,46 This allows us to re-
estimate our model using as dependent variable gross migration flows measured subsequently
to our visa variable. Table 5 report the estimates obtained with OLS on the subset of origin-
destination pairs with positive gross migration flows, and the estimates obtained with PPML
on the full sample of 2,700 observations. The dummy for the visa requirement is negative
and highly statistically significant in specification (3), which restores the cross-sectional
independence of the residuals through the inclusion of origin times nest dummies, and the
45The 15 destination countries are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States; they
are all included in the dataset by Docquier et al. (2009), which represents our main data source for migration
data.
462005 and 2006 are the last two years with data on bilateral migration flows in the dataset by Ortega
and Peri (2013). Our dependent variable aggregates over the two years in order to keep the same structure
as in the previous estimates.
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Table 5: Determinants of migration flows (2005-2006)
Specification (1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable ln(flow) flow flow
Model OLS PPML PPML
ln(networks+1) 0.393*** 0.597*** 0.583***
[0.021] [0.037] [0.048]
Visa requirement -0.244* -0.986*** -0.668***
[0.132] [0.169] [0.133]
Schengen 0.297 0.068 -0.118
[0.271] [0.210] [0.213]
Colony 0.788*** 0.010 0.176
[0.208] [0.194] [0.187]
Common language 0.646*** 0.474*** 0.636***
[0.107] [0.130] [0.172]
ln(distance) -0.581*** -0.429*** -0.479***
[0.063] [0.082] [0.114]
Destination fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Origin fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Origin*nest fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 1,981 2,700 2,700
Adjusted (pseudo) R2 0.864 0.907 0.941
Log pseudo-likelihood - -1,616,062 -908,216
Pesaran (2004) CD test - 7.11 -0.90
p-value - 0.000 0.370
Note: standard errors in brackets; *** significant at the 99
percent level, ** significant at the 95 percent level, * signifi-
cant at the 90 percent level. The dependent variable refers to
gross flows from Ortega and Peri (2013); the nest structure in
specification (3) is the same as in specification (3) in Table 2,
although with a reduced number of destinations; the pseudo
R2 for specifications (2)-(3) is defined as one minus the ratio
between the log-likelihood of the model over the log-likelihood
of a restricted model which only includes a constant.
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size of the estimated effect is in line with the one obtained in our benchmark specification in
Table 2. Getting rid of the incorrect timing between the measurement of the migration flows
and of the visa variable allows the effect of visa policies to emerge more clearly from the
estimates: the coefficient of the visa requirement is also negative and significant, although
only marginally so when the model is estimated with OLS, in the other two specifications,
whose RUM-consistency is however either not testable or rejected by the test on the residuals.
6.3 Different samples
The results from Table 2 do not depend on the particular coverage of the dataset described
in Table 1. Table 6 reruns specifications (2) and (3) from Table 2 while restricting the sample
in two different ways: by population size and by income level.
In terms of population size, the objective of the exercise is to guarantee that the main
results are not driven by the inclusion of very small origin countries in the sample. To this
end, we drop observations with origin countries whose population is lower than one million
inhabitants in 1990. With this, the sample size goes down from 5,611 to 4,497 dyads but the
main results are virtually unaffected, as it can be observed in specifications (1) and (2) from
Table 6. Specification (1) does not include origin-nest fixed effects and the Pesaran CD test
shows that the residuals could be cross-sectionally correlated. The statistic is 15.55 (p-value
of 0.000). The appropriate structure of the residuals is obtained in specification (2), where
the CD statistic is -1.89 (p-value of 0.059). If anything, we can observe a larger coefficient
for the visa requirement than that presented in Table 2.
We can also restrict the sample by income level, so that we focus more particularly in
South-North migration. We do this in specifications (3) and (4) by dropping high-income
OECD countries from the set of origins.47 We are then left with 4,708 observations. Again,
we reject the cross-sectional independence of the residuals in specification (3) where we do
not include origin-nest fixed effects. In specification (4), where we include them, the value
of the CD statistic is -1.55 (p-value of 0.121) so that we can be confident that we have been
able to restore cross-sectional independence and we can interpret the results as coming from
a RUM model. In this case, the coefficient on the networks variable is slightly higher while
the coefficient on the visa variable is smaller in magnitude than in the baseline specification
47This specification omits the Schengen variable, as the restriction of the sample leaves us with no vari-
ability in the data to identify its effect.
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Table 6: Determinants of migration flows (1990-2000), different samples
Population size Developing countries
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable flow flow flow flow
Model PPML PPML PPML PPML
ln(networks+1) 0.654*** 0.569*** 0.662*** 0.609***
[0.043] [0.051] [0.057] [0.065]
Visa requirement 0.016 -0.716*** 0.0004 -0.358**
[0.166] [0.243] [0.178] [0.163]
Schengen 0.671* 0.041 - -
[0.381] [0.236] - -
Colony -0.282** 0.462* -0.005 0.445
[0.220] [0.258] [0.213] [0.341]
Common language 0.320** 0.287* 0.574*** 0.261
[0.133] [0.162] [0.143] [0.210]
ln(distance) -0.381*** -0.116 -0.612*** -0.674***
[0.100] [0.116] [0.157] [0.186]
Destination fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin*nest fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 4,497 4,497 4,708 4,708
Pseudo R2 0.988 0.996 0.992 0.997
Log pseudo-likelihood -4,236,609 -2,181,524 -2,363,592 -1,442,418
Pesaran (2004) CD test 15.55 -1.89 8.49 -1.55
p-value 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.121
Note: standard errors in brackets; *** significant at the 99 percent level, **
significant at the 95 percent level, * significant at the 90 percent level. Spec-
ifications (1) and (2) are estimated on a sample restricted to origin countries
with a population of at least 1 million; specifications (3) and (4) are esti-
mated on a sample that excludes high-income OECD origin countries. The
dependent variable is equal to the maximum between the variation in stocks
and zero; standard errors are robust; the pseudo R2 is defined as one minus
the ratio between the log-likelihood of the model over the log-likelihood of
a restricted model which only includes a constant.
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from Table 2. Still, these differences are not statistically significant. We can also observe
that the distance variable regains significance in this smaller sample.
6.4 Estimation by skill levels
In this part, we take advantage from the fact that the dataset by Docquier et al. (2009) allows
us to compute migration flows (and rates) by skill level. We define the tertiary educated in
their dataset as high-skill whereas the primary and secondary educated are grouped together
as low-skill. Table 7 re-estimates the model with and without origin-nest fixed effects for
both high- and low-skill versions of the dependent variable.
Starting with high-skill migration, specifications (1) and (2) confirm that the visa re-
quirement variable only becomes significant once the opportunities to migrate to alternative
destinations are taken into account, so that multilateral resistance to migration is controlled
for. As before, we can disregard specification (1) on the basis of the CD test, clearly re-
jected with a statistic of 19.91.48 In this case, specification (2) is on the verge of rejecting
the null (p-value of 0.050) but we can still have some confidence that this specification has
less problems of cross-sectional dependence than the first one. It must be noted that both
the network and the visa variable have lower coefficients in absolute levels than the baseline
specification although the differences are not statistically significant.
When we turn to specifications (3) and (4) in Table 7, we are focusing on low-skill
migration. Again, specification (3), without origin-nest fixed effects, has problems of cross-
sectional dependence since the CD test rejects the null with a value of 9.40. Specification (4)
does not have this problem since the statistic is -0.61 and we cannot reject the cross-sectional
independence of the residuals (p-value of 0.543). The bias induced by multilateral resistance
to migration on low-skill flows seems to be of the same nature as the one we observed in
the baseline: lower coefficient on networks and larger on the visa requirement variable in
absolute levels. However, it is interesting to note that the absolute values of both coefficients
are larger than those observed for high-skill migration flows. This is consistent with the idea
that low-skill migration flows might be more sensitive to changes in the costs of migration
than high-skill migration flows.49
48This suggests that the disaggregation of migration flows by skill level does not suffice to remove the
heterogeneity across potential migrants that induces a correlation in the stochastic component of utility.
49These findings are confirmed when we disaggregate the bilateral migration rates by skill level and by
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Table 7: Determinants of migration flows by skill level (1990-2000)
High-skill Low-skill
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable flow flow flow flow
Model PPML PPML PPML PPML
ln(networks+1) 0.615*** 0.496*** 0.703*** 0.608***
[0.038] [0.037] [0.052] [0.056]
Visa requirement -0.073 -0.559*** 0.110 -0.718***
[0.131] [0.238] [0.213] [0.268]
Schengen 0.629** -0.305* 0.960* 0.879*
[0.281] [0.178] [0.565] [0.467]
Colony -0.152 0.327 -0.238 0.652**
[0.162] [0.221] [0.260] [0.279]
Common language 0.548*** 0.619*** 0.084 0.048
[0.114] [0.131] [0.158] [0.207]
ln(distance) -0.175* -0.220** -0.470*** -0.053
[0.092] [0.088] [0.120] [0.131]
Destination fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin*nest fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,611 5,611 5,611 5,611
Pseudo R2 0.934 0.983 0.993 0.997
Log pseudo-likelihood -1,560,807 -690,849 -3,189,084 -1,720,273
Pesaran (2004) CD test 19.91 -1.96 9.40 -0.61
p-value 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.543
Note: standard errors in brackets; *** significant at the 99 percent level, **
significant at the 95 percent level, * significant at the 90 percent level. The
dependent variable in specifications (1) and (2) refers to migration flows
that are tertiary educated in Docquier et al. (2009); specifications (3) and
(4) refer to migration flows that are primary and secondary educated. The
dependent variable is equal to the maximum between the variation in stocks
and zero; standard errors are robust.
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It is useful to compare the different sensitivity of migration flows by skill level to networks
and migration policies by looking again at the implied elasticities according to a RUM model.
This is done in Table 8, based in specifications (2) and (4) from Table 7. We can see that
the bounds for the direct elasticity of bilateral migration flows with respect to bilateral
networks differ between 0.40 to 0.50 for high-skill flows and between 0.50 and 0.61 for low-
skill flows. For the cross elasticities, the differences are smaller: between -0.10 and 0.00 for
high-skill flows and between -0.11 and 0.00 for low-skill flows. In the case of the direct effects
of bilateral visas on migration flows, the bounds are between -0.42 and -0.35 for high-skill
flows but they go up to between -0.50 and -0.42 for low-skill flows. Correspondingly, the
externality effect of the visa requirement is also larger for low-skill flows, between 3 and 19
percent, compared with the interval for high-skill flows, between 2 and 14 percent.
6.5 Endogeneity of networks
An additional concern with the estimation of the determinants of migration flows is that of
the endogeneity of migration networks. Factors that generated the networks up to 1990, such
as migration flows between 1980 and 1990, are likely to be correlated with the determinants
of 1990-2000 migration flows. To address this concern, Beine et al. (2011) applied two-stage
least squares by instrumenting the size of migration networks in 1990 with old bilateral guest
worker agreements and different proxies for the networks in 1960, which they did not observe.
We have the advantage that a new dataset, created by Ozden et al. (2011), has come out,
which provides us with more precise estimates of the size of the networks in 1960. Thus, we
use the networks in 1960 as an instrument for the networks in 1990. We resort to two-stage
residual inclusion,50 given that the Poisson model is non-linear and 2SPS would generally be
inconsistent (Terza et al., 2008).
The results are presented in Table 9 for several correct specifications discussed in the
paper.51 The first stage is very strong, with the size of networks in 1960 having substantial
explanatory power over the 1990 variable (the correlation between the two variables is 0.76
in the full sample). Specification (1) reproduces the baseline correct specification (3) from
gender; the visa effect for both genders is larger in magnitude for low- than for high-skilled individuals, and
slightly larger for men than for women. Results are available from the authors upon request.
50Recent applications of the 2SRI estimator within the migration literature can be found in Beine et al.
(2012), Marchetta (2012) and Bertoli and Marchetta (2015).
51We present bootstrapped standard errors after 1,000 replications to account for the two-step estimation.
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Table 8: Direct and indirect elasticities of networks and visa by skill level
Flow High-skill Low-skill
Bound lower upper lower upper
Networks
Direct effect 0.398 0.495 0.495 0.608
(0.143) (0.007) (0.185) (0.002)
Indirect effect -0.098 -0.001 -0.113 0.000
(0.143) (0.007) (0.185) (0.002)
Visa
Direct effect -0.417 -0.350 -0.497 -0.420
(0.034) (0.114) (0.048) (0.140)
Indirect effect 0.019 0.138 0.031 0.189
(0.060) (0.200) (0.099) (0.287)
Note: standard deviations in parentheses. The
bounds correspond to averages, weighted by popu-
lation at origin, over equations (12), (13) and (B.1)-
(B.3) based on the estimates in specifications (2) and
(4) in Table 7.
Table 2. The main significant change is the notable increase in the coefficient of migration
networks, which suggests that the previous estimate was downward biased. The new co-
efficient is a strongly significant 0.77, coinciding with the result in Beine et al. (2011). A
possible interpretation of the direction of the bias, which is also reflected in the negative and
significant coefficient for the first stage residuals, relates to return migration: a larger net-
work can be associated with a larger scale of return migration, which influences a dependent
variable that captures variation in stocks rather than gross migration flows. As for the visa,
the coefficient remains negative and significant at the 90 percent confidence level: -0.62. The
rest of specifications are shown for robustness purposes and carry exactly the same message:
there is some downward bias on the networks coefficient in the baseline whereas the visa
coefficient is virtually unaffected although the larger standard errors make it marginally sig-
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Table 9: Determinants of migration flows (1990-2000), two-stage residual inclusion
Sample Baseline
Population Developing High- Low-
Size Countries Skill Skill
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable flow flow flow flow flow
Model 2SRI PPML 2SRI PPML 2SRI PPML 2SRI PPML 2SRI PPML
ln(networks+1) 0.766*** 0.780*** 0.791*** 0.661*** 0.799***
[0.095] [0.096] [0.130] [0.078] [0.112]
Visa requirement -0.621* -0.682* -0.329a -0.543* -0.653b
[0.462] [0.559] [0.327] [0.473] [0.498]
Schengen -0.032 0.016 - -0.325 0.810*
[0.334] [0.340] - [0.244] [0.547]
Colony -0.082 -0.042 -0.004 -0.163 0.177
[0.363] [0.360] [0.467] [0.289] [0.402]
Common language 0.098 0.051 0.037 0.469** -0.161
[0.236] [0.243] [0.348] [0.208] [0.308]
ln(distance) 0.191 0.234 -0.240 0.020 0.264
[0.198] [0.203] [0.421] [0.147] [0.236]
First stage residual -0.248** -0.265** -0.224* -0.208*** -0.237*
[0.099] [0.101] [0.135] [0.078] [0.125]
Destination fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin*nest fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,611 4,497 4,708 5,611 5,611
Pseudo R2 0.996 0.996 0.997 0.982 0.997
Log pseudo-likelihood -2,168,416 -2,129,898 -1,421,063 -678,062 -1,694,777
Pesaran (2004) CD test -1.60 -1.89 -1.48 -1.78 -0.38
p-value 0.110 0.059 0.139 0.074 0.701
First stage F-stat 540.37 445.71 359.70 540.37 540.37
Note: bootstrapped standard errors after 1,000 replications in brackets; *** significant at the 99
percent level, ** significant at the 95 percent level, * significant at the 90 percent level, a test that
the coefficient is positive p-value = 0.115, b test that the coefficient is positive p-value = 0.100.
Specification (1) as specification (3) in Table 2; specifications (2) and (3) and specifications (2) and
(4) in Table 6; specifications (4) and (5) as specifications (2) and (4) in Table 7. The dependent
variable is equal to the maximum between the variation in stocks and zero; the excluded instrument
is the natural logarithm of one plus the size of migration networks in 1960 (see Table 1).
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nificant. None of the specifications rejects the null of cross-sectional independence in the
residuals.
7 Concluding remarks
The migration of people across borders can be severely limited by the policies adopted at
destination. Our paper provides a contribution to the understanding of the influence exerted
by bilateral visa policies on international migration flows, which can be identified only when
the confounding effect due to multilateral resistance to migration is adequately controlled for.
The prevailing visa regime significantly contributes to determine the height of the “cliff at
the border” (Pritchett, 2009), and a change in the requirements for non-immigrant admission
can influence the scale of migration flows directed both to the country changing its policy
and to other destinations.
The estimation of the determinants of international migration on aggregate data does
not allow us to recover the structural parameters of the underlying theoretical model, and
this creates an unavoidable uncertainty on the estimated direct and indirect effect of the
visa policy. Our estimates entail that, on average, the introduction of a visa requirement
reduces direct bilateral flows between 40 and 47 percent, while increasing the flows toward
other destinations between 3 and 17 percent. The uncertainty on the true size of the effect
notwithstanding, these figures are strongly suggestive of the relevance of the legal framework
for non-immigrant admission in shaping the scale and direction of international migration
flows. These results confirm and extend the findings in Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Mor-
aga (2013), and are based on an estimation technique with minimal data requirements, which
is well-suited for most of the existing international migration datasets.
While we have shown our results to be quite robust to a number of variations in our
estimation strategy, it is true that our estimated externality depends on the precise definition
of the nests of alternative destinations that potential migrants perceive as close substitutes.
An obvious topic for further research is to make the choice of these nests completely data-
driven along the lines proposed by Bonhomme and Manresa (2012) and Bai and Ando (2013)
for the case of non-linear estimation techniques while restricting the errors of the resulting
models to be cross-sectionally independent.
Etudes et Documents n° 27, CERDI, 2014
47
References
Anderson, J. (2011): “The Gravity Model,” Annual Review in Economics, 3(1), 133–160.
Anderson, J., and E. van Wincoop (2003): “Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the
Border Puzzle,” The American Economic Review, 93(1), 170–192.
Bai, J., and T. Ando (2013): “Panel data models with grouped factor structure under
unknown group membership,” MPRA Paper 52782, University Library of Munich, Ger-
many.
Beine, M., S. Bertoli, and J. Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2014): “A practitioners’
guide to gravity models of migration,” The World Economy, forthcoming.
Beine, M., F. Docquier, and C¸. O¨zden (2011): “Diasporas,” Journal of Development
Economics, 95(1), 30–41.
Beine, M., E. Lodigiani, and R. Vermeulen (2012): “Remittances and financial open-
ness,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 42(5), 844–857.
Beine, M., and C. Parsons (2014): “Climatic factors as determinants of International
Migration,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12098.
Belot, M., and S. Ederveen (2012): “Cultural barriers in migration between OECD
countries,” Journal of Population Economics, 25(3), 1077–1105.
Belot, M., and T. Hatton (2012): “Skill Selection and Immigration in OECD Coun-
tries,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 114(4), 1105–1128.
Bertoli, S., H. Bru¨cker, and J. Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013a): “The Eu-
ropean Crisis and Migration to Germany: Expectations and the Diversion of Migration
Flows,” CERDI Discussion Paper No. 2013/21, Clermont-Ferrand.
Bertoli, S., and J. Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013): “Multilateral Resistance to
Migration,” Journal of Development Economics, 102, 79–100.
Bertoli, S., J. Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga, and F. Ortega (2011): “Immigration
Policies and the Ecuadorian Exodus,” World Bank Economic Review, 25(1), 57–76.
Etudes et Documents n° 27, CERDI, 2014
48
(2013b): “Crossing the Border: Self-Selection, Earnings and Individual Migration
Decisions,” Journal of Development Economics, 101(1), 75–91.
Bertoli, S., and F. Marchetta (2015): “Bringing It All Back Home: Return migration
and fertility choices,” World Development, 65, 27–40.
Boeri, T., and H. Bru¨cker (2005): “Why Are Europeans So Tough on Migrants?,”
Economic Policy, 20(44), 631–703.
Bonhomme, S., and E. Manresa (2012): “Grouped Patterns Of Heterogeneity In Panel
Data,” CEMFI Working Paper No. 2012-1208, Madrid.
Borjas, G. J. (1987): “Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 77(4), 531–553.
Bratsberg, B., J. E. Dølvik, and O. Raaum (2012): “Economic Shocks, the Legal
Environment and Work-related Migration,” paper presented at the VI Workshop on Mi-
gration and Labor Economics organized by INSIDE-MOVE, NORFACE and CReAM, IAE
(CSIC), October 18-19.
Cameron, A., and P. Trivedi (2010): Microeconometrics Using Stata. College Station:
Stata Press, revised edition.
Cardell, N. S. (1997): “Variance Components Structures for the Extreme-Value and
Logistic Distributions with Application to Models of Heterogeneity,” Econometric Theory,
13(2), 185–213.
Chiswick, B. R. (1988): “Illegal Immigration and Immigration Control,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives, 2(3), 101–115.
Clark, X., T. Hatton, and J. Williamson (2007): “Explaining U.S. immigration,
1971-1998,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(2), 359–373.
Clemens, M. (2011): “Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(3), 83–106.
De Hoyos, R., and V. Sarafidis (2006): “Testing for cross-sectional dependence in
panel-data models,” Stata Journal, 6(4), 482–496.
Etudes et Documents n° 27, CERDI, 2014
49
Docquier, F., B. L. Lowell, and A. Marfouk (2009): “A Gendered Assessment of
Highly Skilled Emigration,” Population and Development Review, 35(2), 297–321.
Docquier, F., and H. Rapoport (2012): “Globalization, brain drain and development,”
Journal of Economic Literature, 50(3), 681–730.
Eberhardt, M. (2011): “XTCD: Stata module to investigate Variable/Residual Cross-
Section Dependence,” Statistical Software Components, Boston College Department of
Economics.
Egger, P., M. Larch, K. E. Staub, and R. Winkelmann (2011): “The Trade Effects
of Endogenous Preferential Trade Agreements,” American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy, 3(3), 113–143.
Frees, E. W. (1995): “Assessing cross-sectional correlation in panel data,” Journal of
Econometrics, 69(2), 393–414.
Giordani, P. E., and M. Ruta (2013): “Coordination failures in immigration policy,”
Journal of International Economics, 89(1), 55–67.
Gourieroux, C., A. Monfort, and A. Trognon (1984): “Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
Methods: Applications to Poisson Models,” Econometrica, 52(3), 701–720.
Grogger, J., and G. H. Hanson (2011): “Income maximization and the selection and
sorting of international migrants,” Journal of Development Economics, 95(1), 42–57.
Guimaraes, P., O. Figueiredo, and D. Woodward (2003): “A Tractable Approach to
the Firm Location Decision Problem,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 85(1), 201–204.
(2004): “Industrial Location Modeling: Extending the Random Utility Frame-
work,” Journal of Regional Science, 44(1), 1–20.
Head, K., J. Ries, and D. Swenson (1995): “Agglomeration benefits and location choice:
Evidence from Japanese manufacturing investments in the United States,” Journal of
International Economics, 38(3-4), 223–247.
Hensher, D. A., and W. H. Greene (2003): “The Mixed Logit model: The state of
practice,” Transportation, 30(2), 133–176.
Etudes et Documents n° 27, CERDI, 2014
50
Hsiao, C., M. H. Pesaran, and A. Pick (2012): “Diagnostic Tests of Cross-section
Independence for Limited Dependent Variable Panel Data Models,” Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics, 74(2), 253–277.
Levinson, A. (1996): “Environmental regulations and manufacturers’ location choices:
Evidence from the Census of Manufactures,” Journal of Public Economics, 62(1-2), 5–29.
Lewer, J. J., and H. V. den Berg (2008): “A gravity model of immigration,” Economics
Letters, 99(1), 164–167.
Marchetta, F. (2012): “Return migration and the survival of entrepreneurial activities in
Egypt,” World Development, 40(10), 1999–2013.
Mayda, A. M. (2010): “International migration: a panel data analysis of the determinants
of bilateral flows,” Journal of Population Economics, 23(4), 1249–1274.
Mayer, T., and S. Zignago (2011): “Notes on CEPII‘s distances measures: The GeoDist
database,” CEPII Working Paper No. 2011-25, Paris.
McFadden, D. (1974): “Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior,” in Fron-
tiers in Econometrics, ed. by P. Zarembka, pp. 105–142. New York: Academic Press.
(1978): “Modeling the Choice of Residential Location,” in Spatial interaction theory
and planning models, ed. by A. Karlqvist, L. Lundqvist, F. Snickars, and J. Weibull, pp.
75–96. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
McKenzie, D., C. Theoharides, and D. Yang (2013): “Distortions in the International
Migrant Labor Market: Evidence from Filipino Migration and Wage Responses to Des-
tination Country Economic Shocks,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
6(2), 49–75.
Moscone, F., and E. Tosetti (2009): “A review and comparison of tests of cross-section
independence in panels,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 23(3), 528–561.
Neumayer, E. (2006): “Unequal access to foreign spaces: how states use visa restrictions
to regulate mobility in a globalized world,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geog-
raphers, 31(1), 72–84.
Etudes et Documents n° 27, CERDI, 2014
51
(2010): “Visa Restrictions and Bilateral Travel,” The Professional Geographer,
62(2), 171–181.
(2011): “On the detrimental impact of visa restrictions on bilateral trade and
foreign direct investment,” Applied Geography, 31(3), 901 – 907.
Okawa, Y., and E. van Wincoop (2012): “Gravity in International Finance,” Journal
of International Economics, 87(2), 205–215.
Ortega, F., and G. Peri (2013): “The Role of Income and Immigration Policies in
Attracting International Migrants,” Migration Studies, 1(1), 27–46.
O¨zden, C¸., C. R. Parsons, M. Schiff, and T. L. Walmsley (2011): “Where on
Earth is Everybody? The Evolution of Global Bilateral Migration 1960-2000,” World
Bank Economic Review, 25(1), 12–56.
Perkins, R., and E. Neumayer (2013): “Geographies of educational mobilities: exploring
the uneven flows of international students,” Geographical Journal, 180(3), 246–259
Pesaran, M. H. (2004): “General Diagnostic Tests for Cross Section Dependence in Pan-
els,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 1204, Bonn.
Pritchett, L. (2006): Let Their People Come. Washington: Center for Global Develop-
ment.
(2009): “The Cliff at the Border,” in Equity and Growth in a Globalizing World,
ed. by R. Kanbur, and M. Spence, pp. 263–286. Washington: The World Bank and the
Commission on Growth and Development.
Santos Silva, J. M. C., and S. Tenreyro (2006): “The Log of Gravity,” Review of
Economics and Statistics, 88(4), 641–658.
(2011): “Further simulation evidence on the performance of the Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood estimator,” Economics Letters, 112(2), 220–222.
Schmidheiny, K., and M. Bru¨lhart (2011): “On the equivalence of location choice
models: Conditional logit, nested logit and Poisson,” Journal of Urban Economics, 69(2),
214–222.
Etudes et Documents n° 27, CERDI, 2014
52
Simpson, N. B., and C. Sparber (2013): “The Short- and Long-Run Determinants of
Unskilled Immigration into U.S. States,” Southern Economic Journal, 80(2), 414–438.
Terza, J., A. Basu, and P. Rathouz (2008): “A two stage residual inclusion estimation:
addressing endogeneity in health econometric modeling,” Journal of Health Economics,
27(3), 531–543.
Train, K. (2003): Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge University Press.
Trivedi, P., and M. Munkin (2010): “Recent Developments in Cross Section and Panel
Count Models,” in Handbook of Empirical Economics and Finance, ed. by A. Ullah, and
D. Giles, pp. 87–131. Oxford: Taylor and Francis.
UN Population Division (2008): Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Re-
vision. United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2008.
US General Accounting Office (2004): “Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of
Homeland Security and a Layered Defense,” Report to the Chairman, Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives, Washington.
Etudes et Documents n° 27, CERDI, 2014
53
Appendix
A Estimates under different nest structures
Table A.1: Determinants of migration flows (1990-2000), different nests
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(networks+1) 0.658*** 0.645*** 0.627*** 0.577*** 0.570*** 0.567***
[0.042] [0.042] [0.045] [0.047] [0.048] [0.049]
Visa requirement 0.017 0.064 -0.706*** -0.666*** -0.663*** -0.667***
[0.161] [0.235] [0.184] [0.211] [0.212] [0.215]
Schengen 0.651* 0.286 0.270 0.288 0.290 0.034
[0.381] [0.237] [0.242] [0.242] [0.244] [0.235]
Colony -0.290 0.060 0.148 0.444* 0.455* 0.451*
[0.217] [0.221] [0.229] [0.247] [0.249] [0.256]
Common language 0.333** 0.225 0.260* 0.221 0.229 0.302*
[0.130] [0.154] [0.145] [0.153] [0.154] [0.161]
ln(distance) -0.382*** 0.027 -0.012 -0.115 -0.113 -0.121
[0.098] [0.106] [0.113] [0.113] [0.116] [0.116]
Destination fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin*nest fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,611 5,611 5,611 5,611 5,611 5,611
Pseudo R2 0.988 0.993 0.994 0.995 0.995 0.996
Log pseudo-likelihood -4,294,695 -3,160,509 -2,667,687 -2,340,175 -2,323,708 -2,213,844
Pesaran (2004) CD test 17.35 5.52 3.92 3.82 3.30 -1.57
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.117
Assignment of destination countries to nests
Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1
Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 1
Finland 1 1 1 1 1 1
France 1 1 1 1 1 1
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1
Greece 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 1
Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1
Luxembourg 1 1 1 1 1 1
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1
Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 1
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 1
United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 1 1
Iceland 1 1 1 1 2 2
Norway 1 1 1 1 2 2
Switzerland 1 1 1 1 2 2
Czech Republic 1 1 1 1 2 3
Hungary 1 1 1 1 2 3
Poland 1 1 1 1 2 3
Slovakia 1 1 1 1 2 3
Canada 1 2 2 2 3 4
United States 1 2 2 2 3 4
Australia 1 2 2 3 4 5
Japan 1 2 2 3 4 5
New Zealand 1 2 2 3 4 5
Korea 1 2 3 4 5 6
Mexico 1 2 3 4 5 6
South Africa 1 2 3 4 5 6
Turkey 1 2 3 4 5 6
Note: the dependent variable is the size of the flow, and all specifications are estimated with PPML;
standard errors in brackets; *** significant at the 99 percent level, ** significant at the 95 percent
level, * significant at the 90 percent level. The dependent variable is equal to the maximum between
the variation in stocks and zero; standard errors are robust.
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B Direct and indirect effects of visas on migration flows
Let V̂jk/τ represent the estimated value of the deterministic component of location-specific
utility, and V̂ 1jk/τ and V̂
0
jk/τ represent the corresponding values when a visa requirement is
imposed from country k upon country j and when a visa waiver is granted. The ratio v̂kjk
between the size of the bilateral migration flow conditional upon V̂ 1jk/τ and the size of the
flow conditional upon V̂ 0jk/τ measures the effect of the introduction of a visa requirement by
country k on mjk. Similarly, we can define v̂kjl as the impact on mjl due to the imposition
of a visa requirement by country k upon the citizens of country j.
From (5), we have that:52
v̂kjk = e
β̂1/τ
[∑
l∈b(k)/{k} e
V̂jl/τ + eV̂
0
jk/τ∑
l∈b(k)/{k} e
V̂jl/τ + eV̂
1
jk/τ
]1−τ[∑
l∈D/{k} e
V̂jl/τ + eV̂
0
jk/τ∑
l∈D/{k} e
V̂jl/τ + eV̂
1
jk/τ
]τ
v̂kjk, which is monotonic in τ for any given estimate β̂/τ of the vector β/τ , is equal to
a weighted geometric average of the effect of the introduction of a visa requirement when τ
converges to 0 and when τ = 1. When τ converges to 0, v̂kjk converges to:
v̂kjk|τ=0 = eβ̂1/τ
∑
l∈b(k)/{k} e
V̂jl/τ + eV̂
0
jk/τ∑
l∈b(k)/{k} e
V̂jl/τ + eV̂
1
jk/τ
(B.1)
When τ = 1, this becomes:
v̂kjk|τ=1 = eβ̂1/τ
∑
l∈D/{k} e
V̂jl/τ + eV̂
0
jk/τ∑
l∈D/{k} e
V̂jl/τ + eV̂
1
jk/τ
(B.2)
If β̂1/τ < 0, then the effect is larger in magnitude when τ converges to zero (upper bound)
than when τ = 1 (lower bound).53 With respect to the effect v̂kjl due to the introduction of
a visa requirement by another country l upon mjk, we have that
v̂kjl ∈
[∑
l∈D/{k} e
V̂jl/τ + eV̂
0
jk/τ∑
l∈D/{k} e
V̂jl/τ + eV̂
1
jk/τ
,
∑
l∈b(k)/{k} e
V̂jl/τ + eV̂
0
jk/τ∑
l∈b(k)/{k} e
V̂jl/τ + eV̂
1
jk/τ
)
(B.3)
52Without loss of generality, we denote with β1 the parameter in (2) associated to the variable denoting
the bilateral visa policy.
53The percentage change induced by the introduction of a visa requirement is simply v̂kjk − 1.
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